# Bias and Securities in Large Language Models


Aaron Luo

Washington University in St. Louis
Mckelvey School of Engineering

*aaron.l@wustl.edu*


March 25, 2024

# Outline

1. Whose Opinions Do Language Models Reflect
   - Introduction
   - Methodology
   - Result
2. Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models
   - Introduction
   - Methodology

# Why interested in Bias

# Why interested in Bias




Figure: Large Language Model Pre-training framework

# Whose Opinions Do Language Models Reflect

- language models have offered subjective opinions to controversial social and political queries
- whose opinions (if any) do language models reflect?

# Methodology

1. The author first built a dataset with 1498 well-worded question
2. Evaluate 9 language model's opinion's opinion on these queries
3. Compare the response of language models against general U.S population

# Evaluation of LLMs opinions

## Metric

(1) Representativeness: This metric assesses how well the default opinions generated by language models (LMs) align with the opinions of the general U.S. population or specific demographic groups.
(2) Steerability: This metric evaluates whether an LM can be prompted to more closely emulate the opinion distribution of a specific group.
(3) Consistency: This metric looks at whether the groups LMs align with remain consistent across different topics.

# Group representatives

## Quantify Representativeness

The author defines the alignment score between the language model $m$ and a particular demographic group $O$ is defined as

$$R_m^O(Q) = A(D_m, D_o, Q) \tag{1}$$

- $D_m$ denotes the marginal opinion distribution of the language model
- $D_O$ denotes the marginal opinion distribution of the demographic group $O$
- $Q$ denotes the topic being measured
- $A()$ is called the Wasserstein distance function

# Alignment Score

$$A(D_1, D_2; Q) = \frac{1}{|Q|} \sum_{q \in Q} \left( 1 - \frac{WD(D_1(q), D_2(q))}{N - 1} \right) \tag{2}$$

The function calculates the alignment score of two demographic groups $D_1$ and $D_2$ on the topic $Q$.

# Wasserstein Distance

## Definition

The **Wasserstein distance** between two probability distributions $P$ and $Q$ on a metric space $(M, d)$ is the infimum cost of transporting mass in transforming $P$ into $Q$.

$$W(P, Q) = \inf_{\gamma \in \Gamma(P,Q)} \int_{M \times M} d(x, y)\, d\gamma(x, y)$$

- Intuitively, it measures how much "work" it takes to transform one distribution into the other, considering the amount and distance of mass moved.




| Humans | | AI21 Labs | | | OpenAI | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avg | Worst | j1-grande | j1-jumbo | j1-grande-v2-beta | ada | davinci | text-ada-001 | text-davinci-001 | text-davinci-002 | text-davinci-003 |
| 0.949 | 0.865 | 0.813 | 0.816 | 0.804 | 0.824 | 0.791 | 0.707 | 0.714 | 0.763 | 0.700 |

Figure: Group representatives score

# Group representatives

| Model | AI21 Labs | | | OpenAI | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | j1-grande | j1-jumbo | j1-grande-v2-beta | ada | davinci | text-ada-001 | text-davinci-001 | text-davinci-002 | text-davinci-003 |
| POLIDEOLOGY | | | | | | | | | |
| Very conservative | 0.805 | 0.797 | 0.778 | 0.811 | 0.772 | 0.702 | 0.697 | 0.734 | 0.661 |
| Conservative | 0.800 | 0.796 | 0.780 | 0.810 | 0.773 | 0.707 | 0.707 | 0.748 | 0.683 |
| Moderate | 0.810 | 0.814 | 0.804 | 0.822 | 0.792 | 0.706 | 0.716 | 0.763 | 0.705 |
| Liberal | 0.786 | 0.792 | 0.788 | 0.798 | 0.774 | 0.696 | 0.715 | 0.767 | 0.721 |
| Very liberal | 0.780 | 0.785 | 0.782 | 0.791 | 0.768 | 0.688 | 0.708 | 0.761 | 0.711 |

| Model | AI21 Labs | | | OpenAI | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | j1-grande | j1-jumbo | j1-grande-v2-beta | ada | davinci | text-ada-001 | text-davinci-001 | text-davinci-002 | text-davinci-003 |
| INCOME | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than $30,000 | 0.825 | 0.828 | 0.813 | 0.833 | 0.801 | 0.709 | 0.716 | 0.758 | 0.692 |
| $30,000-$50,000 | 0.812 | 0.814 | 0.802 | 0.822 | 0.790 | 0.708 | 0.713 | 0.759 | 0.698 |
| $50,000-$75,000 | 0.804 | 0.807 | 0.795 | 0.816 | 0.784 | 0.705 | 0.712 | 0.762 | 0.702 |
| $75,000-$100,000 | 0.799 | 0.800 | 0.791 | 0.811 | 0.781 | 0.703 | 0.711 | 0.762 | 0.705 |
| $100,000 or more | 0.794 | 0.797 | 0.790 | 0.807 | 0.777 | 0.698 | 0.710 | 0.764 | 0.708 |

Figure: Group representatives as a function of political ideology and income

# Steerability

## Quantify Steerability

To measure steerability, the author defined the following quantity

$$S_m^G(Q) = \frac{1}{|Q|} \sum_{q \in Q} \max_{c_G \in \{QA, BIO, POR\}} A(D_m(q; c_G), D_G(q)) \tag{3}$$

where $D_m(q; c_G)$ is the LM opinion distribution donditioned on the group-specific context $c_G$, $Q$ is the question set of 1498 queries, $G$ is the demographic group, and $\{QA, BIO, PORTRAY\}$ is the set of prompting strategy

# Steerability




(a)




(b)

Figure: Democrats vs Republicans, sexual and racial discrimination, immigration

# Consistency

## Quantify consistency

The author quantified consistency by defining the following quantity,

$$C_m := \frac{1}{T} \sum_{T'} \nVdash \left[ \left( \arg\max_G R_M^G(Q_{T'}) \right) = G_m^{best} \right] \tag{4}$$

where

$$G_m^{best} = \arg\max_G \left( \frac{1}{T} \sum_{T'} R_M^G(Q_{T'}) \right) \tag{5}$$

$G_m^{best}$: the demographic group that best maximizes the alignment score
$R_M^G$: the representativeness score for model $M$ with respect to a particular demographic group $G$ on a set of topics $Q'_T$.
$T$: the total number of topics

# Consistency




Figure: Consistency of LLMs on a range of issues

# Consistency

| AI21 Labs | | | OpenAI | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| j1-grande | j1-jumbo | j1-grande-v2-beta | ada | davinci | text-ada-001 | text-davinci-001 | text-davinci-002 | text-davinci-003 |
| 0.612 | 0.612 | 0.575 | 0.622 | 0.562 | 0.388 | 0.405 | 0.502 | 0.575 |

Figure: Consistency of LM opinions, where a higher score implies higher alignment with the set of groups across topics

# Result

- There exists substantial misalignment between LLMs and general US population on most topics.
- LLMs tend to become more aligned when prompted to behave like it, although none of the previous representativeness issues were resolved.
- None of the LLMs were consistently aligned with specific demographics.
- Sensitivity to formatting of their input prompt

# Threats beyond the model

As language models are versatile, they can potentially output harmful results

- racially biased content
- socially biased information
- misinformation

On one hand, rules are set to restrict the model from outputting the above contents; on the other hand, hackers are trying to get around to break those rules.

# Defense Against Prompt-Level Attack

Prior Approaches require human annotators to manually discover prompts that trigger failures. This paper aims to find diverse, natural language test cases (inputs) $x$ that causes a target language model $p_t(y|x)$ to output some text $y$ that is harmful.

# Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models




Figure: Prompt Level Attack

# Methodology

1. Generate test cases input $x$ using a red language model $p_r(x)$.
2. Use the target language model $p_t(y|x)$ to generate an output $y$ for each test case $x$.
3. Find the test cases that led to a harmful output using the red team classifier $r(x, y)$.

A red classifier $r(x, y)$ predicts whether $y$ is offensive. Examples include language models like GPT-4 which evaluates whether $y$ is someone's social security.

# Zero-shot Generation for Language Model Testing

- **Objective:** Generate test cases to identify harmful outputs from language models (LMs) without specific examples
- **Methodology:** Zero-shot technique—Use simple prompts to influence a pretrained LM to produce diverse test cases aimed at eliciting harmful or offensive responses *without prior training on these scenarios*.

# Stochastic Few-shot Generation

- **Objective:** Enhance test case generation to trigger harmful outputs from language models by using examples of **Zero-shot Generation**.
- **Methodology:**
  - Failing zero-shot test cases are used as few-shot learning cues.
  - A small number of these cases are appended to prompts, guiding the model to generate similar test cases.
  - Stochastic sampling introduces diversity by randomly selecting examples from a pool of failing cases.
  - The difficulty of generated test cases is adjusted by varying the sampling likelihood based on their potential to elicit harmful outputs.

# Supervised Learning

- **Objective:** Improve the pretrained LM responses by fine-tuning on harmful output instances identified through zero-shot generation.
- **Data Source:** Utilizes failing zero-shot test cases as a dataset, specifically those cases where the LM produced harmful or biased outputs.
- **Data Preparation:**
  - Dataset of failing cases is created from the zero-shot generation phase.
  - Split into 90% training and 10% validation sets.
- **Training Approach:**
  - Fine-tune the LM for one epoch on the training set to maximize the log-likelihood of failing cases.
  - Aim to maintain diversity and prevent overfitting.

# Reinforcement Learning (RL)

- **Objective:** Optimize LM to generate test cases that effectively elicit harmful responses from the target LM.
- **Methodology:** Train the generator LM using RL, rewarding it for producing questions leading to offensive replies.
- **Process:** Initialize with a Supervised Learning model, then apply A2C with KL regularization for dynamic adjustment.
- **Goal:** Achieve a high success rate in eliciting harmful outputs, balancing between diversity of test cases and effectiveness in identifying undesirable behaviors.




Figure: Percent of Offensive Response

- ZS achieves 18,444 offensive replies.
- SFS improved offensiveness and maintainedRe diversity.
- SL mirrors SFS's success but with reduced diversity in generated cases.
- RL proves most effective, significantly increasing offensive replies.
- Automated methods rival human-generated BAD dataset in difficulty and diversity.

# Analyzing Offensive Reply Likelihood from DPG




Figure 4: The likelihood of an offensive reply from DPG over the course of conversation, for different methods. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval from bootstrap resampling.




Figure 5: The likelihood of an offensive reply from DPG, conditioned on the last $x$ utterances being offensive. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval from bootstrap resampling.

- **Fig. 4 (Left Graph)**: Increasing likelihood of offensive replies across 8 turns, particularly with Zero-Shot and Conditional Zero-Shot. Stochastic Few-Shot indicates a higher initial probability.
- **Fig. 5 (Right Graph)**: The chance of subsequent offensive replies rises with the number of prior offensive exchanges, especially under the Stochastic Few-Shot method.
- **Non-Adversarial**: Demonstrates a consistently low likelihood, suggesting safer dialogues in

# Conclusion and Implications

- Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models can operate before adversaries.
- "Behavior on failing test cases may then be fixed preemptively."